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The Importance of Access Policies in South-South Migration

Ecuador's Policy of Open Doors as a
Quasi Experiment

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- analyse migration as part of broader global change
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Abstract

South-south flows make up almost half of all emigration from developing countries and roughly a third of international migration worldwide. Nevertheless, international migration theory has focused on explaining south-north migration and has left the dynamics of south-south flows largely unexplored. This paper argues that one key to understanding intercontinental south-south migration is the interplay of immigration policies, and more specifically of access policies. Some migrants from developing countries, who face severe restrictions to reach their preferred destinations in the north, move to accessible destinations in southern regions, either because this opens up opportunities for onward migration to northern countries, or because these countries are relatively attractive in their own right. This paper examines Ecuador's extreme policy of universal visa freedom of 2008 as a quasi-experiment to test the impact of the de facto opening of borders of a Latin American country on south-south migration from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Complementary qualitative findings shed light on the characteristics and motivations of recent extra-continental immigrants in Ecuador.

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1 Introduction

Both the United Nations Population Division and the World Bank estimate that south-south migration¹ accounts for about half of all international migration from developing countries (Ratha and Shaw 2007, UNDESA 2012). If one included irregular migration, this estimate would further increase. South-south movements are extremely dynamic, and their directions and patterns change frequently. Although the majority of migratory movements in the south take place within regions, and often between neighbouring countries (Dumont, Spielvogel et al. 2010, UNDESA 2012), interregional and intercontinental movements are also emerging. In Latin America, for example, intercontinental south-south migration from Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean² (termed ‘extra-continental immigration’ by the receiving governments) significantly increased in recent years (OAS 2010, Freier 2013).

The income differences between sending and receiving countries in south-south migration are much smaller and travel costs much higher than in the case of south-north migration. The increase of south-south migration from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean to Latin America, a region that offers smaller income increases, no cultural ties (in the case of African and Asian immigration) and is more expensive to reach than ‘traditional’ northern destination countries poses an intriguing research puzzle. In order to understand the emergence of intercontinental south-south flows to Latin America it is key to understand the interplay of access policies of preferred northern destinations and Latin American countries.

Access policies play out against a fundamental paradox that characterises the post-World War II nation state-system: most people have the right to leave their home countries, but very few enjoy the right to freely choose where they want to move and settle. Article 13 of the non-binding Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 grants every world citizen the right to leave her home country, ie to emigrate. This right is respected by most governments and in theory implies the freedom to escape state repression, prosecution and economic hardship, or more generally, to seek better opportunities abroad. However, nowhere in international law is there a provision for the reciprocal right to *immigrate* to, or even just to enter a preferred international destination (Sassen 1996).

This paradox is further defined by the asymmetric distribution of travel freedom of citizens of relatively free and wealthy countries concentrated in the northern hemisphere, who face few visa restrictions, and citizens of relatively repressive and poor countries concentrated in the southern hemisphere, who face many (Neumayer 2006, Whyte 2008). In the area of short-stay visas, the principle of reciprocity is seldom applied, and OECD passport holders enjoy high degrees of travel freedom although their countries impose many restrictions on passport holders from other (southern) countries.³ Countries with a history of violent political conflict, strictly autocratic regimes and very poor countries make up the group with the least travel freedom worldwide (Whyte 2008).

¹ South-south migration broadly encompasses international migration between and among developing nations and transitional economies in Africa, Asia, South and Latin America, and parts of Eastern Europe. The term ‘south’ refers to comparatively less developed regions and countries, whereas the term ‘north’ refers to more developed regions or countries, including Europe and Northern America, Australia, New Zealand and Japan (UNDESA 2012). Although this conceptual differentiation is heuristically useful and thus applied in this paper, the ‘south-north’ terminology is misleading in that it does not fully correspond to historic and geographic realities. The terminology further bears the risk of the normative naturalization of a developmental divide between the two hemispheres.

² The author defines the Caribbean as part of the South American continent.

³ Whyte (2008) analyses the Henley & Partners Visa Restriction Index, and shows that in 2010, citizens of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden had visa-free access to more than 160 countries. At the same time, the European Union only granted visa-free access to citizens of 42 states. On the lower end of this hierarchy, Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia had visa-free access to 26, 27 and 31 countries (Whyte 2008).

Many citizens who are able to leave poor, repressive or conflict-ridden states thus cannot legally enter, let alone stay in their preferred – that is wealthy, free and safe northern – countries of destination. The paper departs from the hypothesis that the combination of continuous ‘push-factors’ that motivate migrants to leave their southern home-countries (Hatton and Williamson 2002, de Haas 2010) and increasing migration control enforcement in preferred northern destination countries (Bigo and Guild 2005, Rosenblum 2011) divert migrant flows to southern third countries. The access policies, ie short-stay visa issuing of third countries significantly impact where these flows are diverted to, ie which new south-south flows emerge.

In order to probe the impact of short-stay visa policies of developing countries on intercontinental south-south migration, this paper examines Ecuador’s extreme policy of universal visa freedom of 2008, the de facto opening of its borders, as a quasi-experiment (Cook and Campbell 1979, Meyers 1995, Dunning 2008, Robinson, McNulty et al. 2009). The paper proceeds as follows. The next section briefly assesses how adequately the existing migration literature explains intercontinental south-south migration. The research design of Ecuador’s visa policy-making as a quasi-experiment is then presented. The fourth section provides the data and empirical analysis. The fifth section complements the quantitative results on the impact of Ecuador’s visa policy-making with qualitative findings on south-south migrants’ characteristics and motivations. Finally, some conclusions are presented.

The paper shows that Ecuador’s visa policy of open access resulted in a substantial increase of intercontinental south-south migration. The qualitative findings reveal three main motivations of Asian, African and Caribbean migrants: (1) pressure to leave one’s country of origin, regardless of the destination; (2) settlement in Ecuador because of relatively improved opportunities; and (3) onward migration to North America and Europe.

2 The international migration literature and south-south migration

The key concern of international migration theory are the determinants of international migration; the larger structural causes and specific social, economic and political factors that underlie individual or household decisions to move across national borders (Donato and Jonathan Hiskey 2010). There are four main types of migration determinants: *differential variables*, such as wage differentials and differences in employment rates; *spatial variables*, such as distance and transportation costs; *affinity variables*, such as religion, culture, language and kinship networks; and *access variables*, such as the rules of exit and entry into a country (Weiner 1985).

Regarding political migration determinants such as access variables, a broad (qualitative) consensus finds that the determinants of international migration are overwhelmingly structural and that well-established migration systems are deeply resistant to policy regulation (Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005). Nevertheless, quantitative evidence suggests that immigration policies do shape international migration patterns. Czaika and de Haas (2013) point out that the controversy around migration policy effectiveness rests on the lack of conceptual differentiation between policy *effectiveness* and policy *effects*, with only the former linked to the degree to which clearly stated policy goals are met. Although the effectiveness of immigration policy remains elusive due to ‘discursive’ and ‘implementation’ gaps, immigration policies, and access policies in particular, have a significant impact on migratory movements (Ortega and Peri 2009; Czaika and de Haas 2013).

The author identifies three major gaps in the migration literature that make its application to intercontinental south-south migration inadequate: the dominant south-north bias, the neglect of the effect of short-stay visa policies and the neglect of migrant motivations in explaining international

migration. Despite the fact that south-south, and south-north migration make up the same share, ie roughly one third of international migration (UNDESA 2012), the migration literature in general, and the political migration literature in particular, remain geographically biased. Most studies focus on the ability of North American and European governments to control south-north flows (Freeman 1994; Guiraudon and Joppke 2001; Cornelius and al. 2004; Durand and Massey 2004; Messina and Lahav 2006; Portes and DeWind 2008), without considering the impact of both northern and southern immigration policies on global migration patterns.

Second, studies of the impact of short-stay visa policies, which can be considered one of the simplest, and most straightforward migration policy tools, remain scarce (O'Byrne 2001; Salter 2003; Neumayer 2006). Few scholars include short-stay visa policies when looking at the impact of immigration policies on international flows on an aggregated level (Hatton 2004; Bertoli, Moraga et al. 2011). One obvious reason for the lack of studies of short-stay visas is the lack of reliable data. Both the lists of countries exempt of visas, and visa requirements themselves change frequently and historic data is often very hard to come by (Whyte 2008). However, there also exists a theoretical disregard for the importance of short-stay visas.⁴

One conceivable reason for this theoretical neglect is that short-stay visas, such as tourist visas, do not constitute immigration policy-making in a strict sense. Others might argue that short-stay visa policies don't matter because states are incapable of effectively controlling their borders (see Bhagwati 2003). It is true that national borders – even the high-tech securitised borders of developed countries – are never hermetically sealed off. Nevertheless the access variable of legal entry has a significant impact on the extent to which potential migrants perceive the movement to a specific country as a realistic option. Various studies find that the majority of irregular migrants enter their destination countries legally (Bigo and Guild 2005; Collyer and de Haas 2010) and then overstay their temporary visas. As Brubaker puts it '[S]een from the outside – from the perspective of those turned down for tourist visas (...) – immigration control appears all too effective' (Brubaker 1994): 230, 231).

This leads to the third gap in the migration literature, the neglect of migrant' perceptions and motivations. Departing from the logic of income maximisation of neo-classical migration theory (Lewis 1954; Harris and Todaro 1970; Borjas 1989), so-called push-pull models (Petersen 1958; Lee 1966; Dorigo and Tobler 1983) have gained widespread popularity among migration scholars. Essentially an individual choice and equilibrium model, the push-pull model allows for the integration of different migration determinants derived from various theoretical insights. Economists have further build on this approach to estimate bilateral migrations through optimal choice models (Grogger and Hanson 2008; Ortega and Peri 2009).

Despite the merit of push-pull models, de Haas rightly criticises that they confound macro-level migration determinants with individual migration motives and stresses that '[p]eople will only migrate if they perceive better opportunities elsewhere and have the *capabilities* to move' (de Haas 2011: 16). He thus suggests conceptualising migration as the function of capabilities and aspirations within a given set of opportunity structures. This paper builds on de Haas' approach and choses a mixed methodological design to test the impact of the short-stay visa policy of a developing and thus economically relatively unattractive southern country on intercontinental south-south migration.

⁴ This becomes apparent in the recent study by Bertoli et al. (2011) who identify visa policy as a main determinant of shifting migration of Ecuadorians from the United States to Spain. Nevertheless they call travel freedom to Spain a "small" difference in comparison to U.S. immigration policy.

3 The case of Ecuador's visa policy as a quasi-experiment

In the past decade, when most countries in Europe and North America moved towards more restrictive immigration policies in the light of national security, the 'war on terrorism' (Rudolph 2003) and the global economic crisis (Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009; Tedesco 2010), a substantial number of Latin American countries liberalised⁵ their immigration policies in ways that emphasise the protection of migrants' universal rights in unprecedented ways (Ceriani 2011; Acosta & Freier 2014). Due to this widespread paradigm shift, Latin America offers a number of relevant case studies for the analysis of the impact of changing immigration policies on the increase in intercontinental south-south migration.

The specific case of Ecuador is unique in presenting a quasi-experiment to test the impact of visa policies on south-south migration. In June 2008, President Rafael Correa unilaterally lifted all visa requirements for all nationalities to enter Ecuador for a 90-day tourist stay. Only 6 months after the introduction of travel freedom to Ecuador, short-stay visa requirements were reintroduced for Chinese citizens, and another 18 months later for citizens of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia.⁶ Previous to the introduction of universal travel freedom to Ecuador, visa exemptions had already been in place for all OECD countries except Mexico, most European countries, and almost all South American countries. The majority of countries from Central America, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa, on the other hand, needed a visa. Overall, 130 countries were affected by Ecuador's policy of open doors.

The rationale of quasi-experimental designs is to assess the causal effect of a variable that is changed through an exogenous shock or intervention on an outcome of interest (Cook and Campbell 1979; Meyers 1995). Ideally, this change occurs in a treatment group – as if randomly with respect to other potential causes of different outcomes (Dunning 2008) – while the same variable is held constant in one or more comparable control groups (Meyers 1995). The reversal of the initial treatment strengthens evidence of a causal relationship between the treatment and the dependent variable, if the effect on the latter is thereby also reversed (*ibid*). The quasi-experimental study design of this paper to test the impact of Ecuador's visa policy on south-south migration is a comparative interrupted time-series analysis (Meyers 1995), with a partial reversal of the initial treatment. The initial treatment of the quasi experiment is the implementation of visa freedom, whereas the reintroduction of tourist visas for ten Asian and African countries constitutes a partial reversal of the treatment.

Official net migration rates of a selected group of Asian, African and the Caribbean nationals to Ecuador, excluding countries with prior visa freedom, are compared prior and subsequent to the annulment of all visa requirements, as well as subsequent to the reintroduction of visa requirements. Since Ecuador does not gather official data on immigration and emigration flows (IOM 2011), for the purpose of this paper, the net migration is estimated by the difference between monthly entries and exits of foreigners. Although such estimates are imperfect proxies for migratory movements because they include short-term visits, they have the distinct advantage of also capturing irregular immigration by visa overstayers. The study applies a mid-term series of flow and stock data, six months prior to the policy intervention and five months subsequent to the reintroduction of visa requirements, ie the 2008–2010 period. Peru is treated as a control group that did not experience the treatment of a change in

⁵ The author understands the term liberal as “[f]avourable to ... individual rights and freedoms” (<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/liberal>), i.e. ‘liberal immigration policy’ as favouring migrants’ rights and travel freedom.

⁶ With the reintroduction of visas, Ecuadorian policy was responsive to its unintended impact, namely the increase of south-south migration from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean (Freier 2013 b). The racist stigmatization of these new south-south flows as made up by illegal aliens, delinquents and terrorists led to domestic and international pressure on Correa's government to impede them (*ibid*).

tourist visa policies. Qualitative findings on migrants' characteristics and motivations complement the experimental study.

The selection of the study's time frame deserves some additional consideration. Generally, a short time series is most appropriate for the analysis of policy changes as quasi experiments because they avoid the influence of slowly moving factors that might have endogenously determined policy changes. In the case of migration policy, however, choosing too short a time frame might result in mistaking regularly occurring seasonal migration patterns as changes induced by the policy treatment. Furthermore, it is likely that there is a delay in changes in migration patterns, because the information about an abruptly changed policy first has to reach potential migrants and travel arrangements have to be made accordingly. In a comparative case design, mid to long term series are advantageous because they show parallel movements before the intervention, which would be expected in absence of interactions between the treatment and other omitted variables (Meyers 1995).

Policies always are the product of social and political interests and negotiations. Considering policies as the treatment in a quasi-experiment raises three main concerns: a possible selection bias of the treatment group, endogeneity through confounding variables, and the comparability of control groups (Besley and Case 2000; Dunning 2008; Robinson, McNulty et al. 2009). These potential problems are discussed in the following sections.

3.1 Potential Problem: selection bias of the treatment group

Regarding the possible selection bias of the treatment group it can be pointed out that, since Campbell and Ross' emblematic quasi-experimental study (Campbell and Ross 1970), it has become increasingly common to see quasi-experimental designs that take advantage of jurisdictional or political borders. Such boundaries divide provinces, states or countries into treatment and control groups if a policy shift only occurs in one state or country but not its neighbour(s). The pitfall of the self-selection of treatment groups is of less concern when studying the impact of policies on entire countries, as is the case of this study.

3.2 Potential Problem: endogeneity

The problem of endogeneity when treating policy change as the treatment in a quasi-experiment is that policymakers might change a specific policy in response to within-state changes in either the outcome variable itself, or in response to an unobserved factor that independently influences the outcome variable as well (Besley & Case 2000). Besley & Case (2000) and Meyers (1995) thus point to the importance of understanding the source of the policy change of interest, ie defining the key determinants of the explanatory variable. Only if the variation in the explanatory variable is exogenous to the outcome of interest can the causal effect of the former on the latter be established. In the case of the extreme change in Ecuador's visa policy it would thus be problematic if (a) the policy had been motivated by prior changes in migrant inflows; or (b) the policy change had been a response to an economical up-turn that had also caused increasing south-south immigration. Although this paper is concerned with testing the *impact* of Ecuador's visa policy on south-south migration, the following section briefly explores the *determinants* of the policy change itself.


According to the official press release of the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry, visa-free travel to Ecuador was implemented to apply the universal principle of free movement, as stipulated in the 2008 Constitution, and to promote tourism to Ecuador.⁷ Both of these motivations are questionable. The two

⁷ http://www.mmrree.gob.ec/mre/documentos/novedades/pol_exterior/junio/bol398.htm [Last accessed 08-02-2012]

main immigrant and refugee sending countries – neighbouring Colombia and Peru – have long had free access to Ecuador. In 2008, Ecuador furthermore already managed a very short list of countries whose nationals required tourist visas. Visa exemptions were in place for all OECD countries except Mexico, most European countries, and all South American countries except Guyana and Suriname. It is unlikely that the government expected tourism from Asia, Africa, Central America and the Caribbean, the regions affected by the introduction of travel freedom, to increase. The government certainly did not expect an increase of south-south immigration. In a public statement State Secretary of Migration, Leonardo Carrión, linked the decision of the partial reintroduction of visas in September 2010 to emerging ‘unusual immigration flows’ – the increase of entries of nationals of the ten affected African and Asian countries, up to 70% of which, he claimed, overstayed the permitted tourist stay of 90 days (Freier 2013 b).⁸

Regarding prior migration movements, it has to be pointed out that Ecuador experienced positive net migration of over 500,000 people in the past decade, mainly from neighbouring countries Colombia (due to the civil conflict) and Peru (due to the incentive of the dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy and slightly higher minimum wages). However, citizens of Colombia and Peru not only long enjoyed visa-free travel to Ecuador but since 2002 can travel to Ecuador with their national IDs only.⁹

Figure 1: Net migration to Ecuador 2006-2008



Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador, 2011

In the two years prior to the annulment of visa requirements net migration from Peru and Colombia showed a downward trend, with net migration of Peruvians decreasing from 25,912 in 2006 to 17,720 in 2007, and Colombian net migration from 26,055 in 2006 to 23,906 in 2007. The net migration from all other countries doubled from 6,275 in 2006 to 13,482 in 2007. This surge is mainly based on an increase of net migration from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Canada, Germany, United States and Spain and can thus be attributed to the increase in tourism to Ecuador from 2006 to 2007 (Index Mundi 2013).¹⁰

⁸http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/america_latina/2010/09/100907_ecuador_inmigrantes_africa_asia_visas.shtml

⁹ See Decision 503 of the Andean community.

¹⁰ <http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/ecuador/international-tourism>

Regarding the economy as a possible third determinant of both changes in Ecuador's visa policy and intercontinental south-south migration, it would be problematic had a cyclical upturn motivated both the liberalisation of access policies, because of a greater demand for labour, and also affected increases in south-south immigration, due to increased employment opportunities. With a GDP growth rate of 4.1% in 2006 but only 2% in 2007, the Ecuadorian economy made a negative development the two years prior the annulment of all visa requirements. The official unemployment rate slightly decreased from 10.7% in 2006 to 8.8% in 2007 (Index Mundi, based on CIA Factbook Data) but still remained too high as to suggest an acute labour shortage that could have led to short-stay visa policy liberalisation for the sake of attracting economic immigration. In sum, neither prior changes in the immigration patterns to Ecuador nor a cyclical economic upturn motivated the liberalisation of short-stay visa policy.

The political rationale of the policy change was Correa's strategy of transnationally targeting Ecuadorian emigrants for both domestic and international political purposes (Margheritis 2011; Freier 2013b). The implementation of visa-free travel to Ecuador was an external shock to Ecuadorian politics because it was a single-handed, spontaneous decision by Correa that was not based on any domestic political debate (ibid). In interviews with the author, high-ranking officials explained that the president took the spontaneous decision after a trip to Mexico where he had discussed the increasingly restrictive immigration policy of the United States with Mexican former president Felipe Calderón.

3.3 Potential Problem: comparability of the control group

Peru is a country similar to Ecuador in key parameters that did not experience the same policy intervention of the ad-hoc implementation of universal visa freedom. Pre-treatment differences arguably exist between Ecuador and Peru, and Peru can thus only offer an imperfect control case. When interested in the impact of the extreme change of immigration policy, comparability is especially important across other possible migration determinants. Besides access variables that are considered the treatment in this study, Weiner (1985) distinguishes differential variables, affinity variables, and spatial variables. Similarly, Thielemann distils economic, historic and geographic pull-factors from the migration literature. In addition he distinguishes political from policy related pull-factors, such as access policies (Thielemann 2006).

Regarding economic pull-factors, or differential variables, migrant's decisions are seen as essentially guided by processes of income maximisation and risk minimisation due to increased employment opportunities (Harris and Todaro 1970; Borjas 1989). Both Ecuador and Peru are lower-middle income countries. Ecuador's GDP per capita stood at US\$ 7,500 and Peru's at US\$ 8,500 in 2008 (Index Mundi, based on CIA Factbook Data), with a minimum wage of US\$218 in Ecuador, and US\$180 (S/. 550) in Peru. The unemployment rate was 8.7 per cent in Ecuador and 8.1 per cent in Peru in 2008 (Index Mundi, based on CIA Factbook Data). The economic pull-factors that might have enticed potential immigrants to move to Peru or Ecuador arguably are comparable between the two countries.

As far as historic pull-factors or affinity, such as ideological or cultural links based on colonial legacies and social networks (Fassmann and Münz 1992; Massey et al. 1993) are concerned, Peru and Ecuador are similarly 'foreign' to Asian, African and Caribbean migrants. Spanish is the official language in both countries, which can be considered an equal hindrance for Asian, African and French- and English-speaking Caribbean migrants and an equal advantage for Spanish-speaking Caribbean migrants. In both countries small groups of African slaves arrived during the colonial era, followed by Chinese slave workers after the official end of slavery (1821 in Gran Colombia including Ecuador and 1854 in Peru). Afro-Peruvian and Afro-Ecuadorian, as well as Chinese communities exist in both

countries. However, in 2008 there were no significant communities of more recent extra-continental immigrants in Peru and Ecuador that could have offered the benefits of strong social networks.

Regarding spatial variables, geographic proximity between countries of origin and countries of destination impacts international migration patterns because, despite technological advances in transportation, smaller distances still mean easier access due to lower transportation costs. Ecuador and Peru are similarly difficult to reach for Asian, African and Caribbean migrants. There are no direct flights from Africa and Asia to Ecuador and Peru, and the most economic options via European countries are often barred because they require transit visas. Most Asian and African interviewees in Ecuador had paid various thousand US\$ for their journey.

Lastly, as concerns political pull factors, Thielemann points out that ‘political concerns about personal security and migrants’ acceptance into a new host society can be expected to be important considerations for potential migrants’ (Thielemann 2006: 451). Ecuador and Peru can both be considered relatively free and peaceful countries. For the years 2008 to 2010, Freedom House rated Ecuador with 3 points as partly free and Peru as free with 2.5 points (Freedom House 2009, 2010, 2011).¹¹ Regarding the expected acceptance into the new host society, it is worth pointing out that in the WEF’s recent Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Reports, Ecuador scores significantly below Peru regarding the attitude of society towards foreigners (WEF 2009, 2011).¹² Regarding political pull factors, Peru can thus be considered more attractive to potential immigrants than Ecuador.

In sum, Ecuador’s extreme policy of universal travel freedom makes for a quasi-experiment to assess the impact of short-stay visa policies of a developing country on intercontinental south-south migration for the following reasons: First, the policy change only affected citizens from Asia, Africa, Central America and the Caribbean. Second, the source of visa policy variation was exogenous to changing immigration flows and economic growth (ie increasing labour demand). Third, the issuing of the presidential decree was an external shock to Ecuadorian politics because it was a single-handed, spontaneous decision by the president. Fourth, the effect of Ecuador’s visa policy can be assessed by comparing south-south immigration before and after the introduction of visa-free travel to south-south migration to neighbouring Peru, a country that did not experience the same policy intervention but is comparable across other migration determinants.

4 Data and Empirical Analysis

In a first step, the following section compares the official net migration rates from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean to Ecuador, prior and subsequent to the annulment of all visa requirements, as well as subsequent to the reintroduction of visa requirements for a selected group of nationals. Countries with visa freedom prior to June 2008 are excluded. In a second step these figures are compared to the net migration from the same regions to neighbouring Peru.


The introduction of visa-free access to Ecuador had no impact on the overall patterns of net migration to Ecuador. The net migration for the time period 2008–2010 was 123,939. The high tourist seasons from mid-December to January and from June to August are clearly represented in Figure 2. It is important to keep in mind that the most important tourist sending countries – including all OECD

¹¹ In the Freedom House scale, 1 point represents the most and 7 points the least free countries.

¹² The WEF gathers data by asking respondents, “How welcome are foreign visitors in your country?”. The results are significant beyond tourism, and can be used as a more general proxy for xenophobia. From 2009 to 2011, Ecuador’s scores improved from 6.11 to 5.79 but its rank dropped from 107 to 118 out of 140 countries. Peru scores improved from 6.31 to 6.16 and its rank improved from 85 to 84 out of 140 countries.

countries except Mexico – already were exempt of visa requirements before the treatment of universal visa-free access to Ecuador.

Figure 2: Official entries to Ecuador 2008-2010



Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador, 2011

In the case of intercontinental south-south migration to Ecuador, however, the introduction of visa-free access had a significant impact on net migration patterns, leading to the emergence or strong increase of immigration from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. This impact was especially significant for the Asian and African countries for which visas were reintroduced between 2008 and 2010.

Table 1: Net migration to Ecuador, selected countries (*countries for which visas have been reintroduced)


Region	Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	TOTAL
Africa	Eritrea*	0	0	0	0	0	-2	0	236	398	632
Africa	Ethiopia*	2	8	0	0	0	2	21	132	144	309
Africa	Kenya*	-6	-18	-5	2	8	1	5	198	82	267
Africa	Nigeria*	2	1	5	4	3	3	34	247	133	432
Africa	Somalia*	0		0	2	0	0	0	16	54	72
											1,712
Asia	Afghanistan*	-2	-175	-38	-22	-4	3	4	44	4	-186
Asia	Bangladesh*	-2	4	5	-8	6	1	54	214	276	550
Asia	China*	-36	184	379	16	353	359	7,240	723	551	9769
Asia	Nepal*	4	20	40	-24	-5	-8	41	158	114	340
Asia	Pakistan*	7	30	15	-3	9	32	43	205	221	559
											11,032
Caribbean	Cuba	-360	670	669	225	295	-33	1,013	3,967	2,030	8476
Caribbean	Haiti	-11	31	-8	-2	1	-7	83	696	511	1294
											9,770

Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador, 2011

The numerically most substantial increase of net migration from a single country occurred in the case of China. From June to July 2008, the net migration of Chinese to Ecuador increased almost tenfold (from 250 to 2328). From June to November 2008, 11,387 Chinese citizens entered and 6,946

officially remained in the country. The immediate increase in net migration supports the interpretation of Ecuadorian politicians that people smuggling networks facilitated this new Chinese immigration. With the reversal of the treatment, ie the reintroduction of visas for Chinese citizens on 1 December 2008, net migration fell from 701 in November to negative 328 in December 2008.


Figure 3: Chinese net migration to Ecuador 2008-2010



Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador, 2011

The impact of visa freedom on other Asian nationals was numerically less substantial. The emergence and relative increase of new Asian immigration flows in the visa-free period are nevertheless significant. From July 2008 to August 2010, the entries of other Asian citizens surpassed exits by 1,711. The net migration of citizens from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan, for whom visas were reintroduced on 3 September 2010, was 1,394. This compares to a net migration of negative 115 for the same nationals from 2002 to 2007. Visa-free access thus converted the emigration trend of these groups into a clear immigration trend. The slightly delayed increase in positive net migration suggests that the information about visa-free access first had to travel to the countries of origin and travel plans had to be made accordingly. With the reintroduction of visa requirements, net migration from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan fell from 138 in August to 46 in September and 17 in October 2010.


Figure 4: Asian* net migration to Ecuador 2008-2010 (*excluding China, Japan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore)



Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador, 2011

In the case of African nationals, visa-free access similarly led to the emergence of a clear trend towards increasing immigration, beginning shortly after the policy change. From July 2008 to August 2010, the entries of African citizens surpassed exits by 2,004. The net migration of citizens of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Somalia, for whom visas were reintroduced on 3 September 2010, had been 12 from 2002 to 2007. In the months from July 2008 to August 2010, the net migration of the same nationals increased by more than factor 140 and the number of entries surpassed the number of exits by 1,709. As in the case of Asian citizens, the slight delay in the increase of positive net migration suggests that it took some time for information about visa-free access to reach potential migrants, and for travel plans to be made accordingly. With the reintroduction of visa requirements, net immigration from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria and Somalia fell from 188 in August 2010 back to pre-treatment levels of 8 in September and negative 7 in October 2010.


Figure 5: African* net migration to Ecuador 2008-2010 (*excluding South Africa)



Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador

In the case of south-south migration from the Caribbean, the treatment of visa-free access led to a numerically more substantial increase of net migration. Visa freedom for Caribbean nationals has thus far not been revoked. The two main nationalities of Caribbean migration to Ecuador are Cubans and Haitians. From July 2008 to December 2010, the net migration of Cubans was 7,922, the net migration of Haitians 1,310 and the net migration of all other Caribbean citizens 117. In the case of Cuba, the pattern of high negative net migration in December and high positive net migration in January is noteworthy. This pattern can be explained because Cuban immigrants with regular immigration status (as outlined in the qualitative section) return to Cuba over the Christmas holidays.


Figure 6: Caribbean* net migration to Ecuador 2008-2010 (*excluding Dominican Republic)



Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador


Figures 7, 8 and 9 show that Peru, where no visa freedom was implemented, did not experience the same increase in south-south immigration from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. For the entire time frame of the quasi experiment, the three years from 2008 to 2010, south-south immigration to Ecuador and Peru compares as follows: Asian net migration of 10,801 to Ecuador, compared to negative 3,050 in the case of Peru; African net migration of 2,072 to Ecuador, compared to 79 in the case of Peru; Caribbean net migration of 10,069 to Ecuador, compared to 622 in the case of Peru. The significant increase of intercontinental south-south migration to Ecuador shortly after the introduction of universal visa freedom, that did not take place in neighbouring Peru, suggests that these flows can be ascribed to the liberalisation of Ecuador’s access policies, ie the implementation of universal visa freedom.

Figure 7: Asian net migration to Ecuador and Peru 2008-2010




Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador and the Dirección General de Migración y Naturalización del Peru

Figure 8: African net migration to Ecuador and Peru 2008-2010:



Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador and the Dirección General de Migración y Naturalización del Peru

Figure 9: Caribbean net migration to Ecuador 2008-2010:



Source: Own elaboration based on data of the Dirección de Migración de Ecuador and the Dirección General de Migración y Naturalización del Peru

5 Qualitative findings

The following section outlines the main characteristics and motivations of recent Asian, African and Caribbean immigrants in Ecuador. The findings are based on qualitative field research that was conducted in Quito, Ecuador, between May and August 2011. The research process entailed 93 interviews with immigrants, politicians, officials and NGO representatives. While 58 migrants were interviewed personally, information on approximately 80 immigrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cameroon, China, Cuba, Ghana, Haiti, India, Liberia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Syria was gathered in the in-depth interviews and an accompanying survey.

The section discusses the Asian cases of Chinese, Bangladeshi and Pakistani migrants, the African cases of Eritrean and Nigerian migrants and the Caribbean cases of Cuban and Haitian migrants.

5.1 Asian immigrants

Chinese immigrants are the largest recent Asian immigrant group in Ecuador, with a net migration of 9,769 from 2002 to 2010. Officials estimated the total Chinese population in Ecuador at about 20,000–30,000 in mid-2011. Based on interviews with Leonardo Carrión, State Secretary for Migration, Gu Jiafeng, political advisor of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China, and Alejandro Díaz Chong, secretary of the *Confederación y Asociación de la Colonia China en Ecuador*,¹³ most of the recent Chinese immigrants are young adults with medium to low educational levels.

Businessman Alejandro Díaz Chong described recent Chinese immigrants as young men who come to Ecuador to seek better economic opportunities. He believes that few Chinese are victims of people smuggling or human trafficking networks and that the majority is able to afford the costs of travel of approximately \$4,000 (for the flight and for obtaining the paperwork to legally remain in Ecuador after the 90 day tourist visa elapses). At the same time, Chong reported that some poor Chinese migrants have to work to pay for their journey after their arrival in Ecuador – suggesting that they possibly are victims of human trafficking. Díaz Chong sees Ecuador as increasingly less attractive for Chinese investment (and thus immigration) because of increasing labour costs and labour and tax controls. He believes that these developments are leading to increasing onwards migration to Argentina, Colombia and Peru, where Chinese migrants seek better business opportunities.

Political advisor Gu Jiafeng similarly stressed transmigration, albeit not to neighbouring countries. He estimated that one third of Chinese migrants that entered Ecuador since 2008 have moved on to northern destinations, one third have remained in Ecuador, and another third returned to China when they realised that the economic situation and the prospect of easily earning US Dollars was not nearly as promising as they had believed. Intriguingly, he stated that Chinese migrants use Ecuador as a platform not only to reach North American, but also European countries – mainly Germany, France, England and Italy – with counterfeit passports. Jiafeng blamed restrictive European immigration policies for diverting Chinese migration to Ecuador for subsequent irregular transmigration to their preferred destinations in Europe.

Recent Bangladeshi and Pakistani immigration rates are much lower, with a Bangladeshi net migration of 550 and a Pakistani net migration of 423 from 2002 to 2010. Officials estimated both populations currently in Ecuador at only about 100 members in mid-2011. Patricio Izurieta Mora Bowen, Honorary Consul of Bangladesh since 1984, recalled a first group of rather affluent Bangladeshi businessmen entering Ecuador after the country’s dollarization in 2000. According to the Honorary Consul, the majority of Bangladeshi immigrants in Ecuador have medium educational levels and many work in the textile industry. With visa-free access in 2008, poorer and less educated Bangladeshi started arriving in Ecuador.

The author interviewed one group of Bangladeshi men, selling empanadas in the historic centre of Quito. One of the three openly admitted that he had been a victim of people smugglers and paid \$15,000 to reach Ecuador in 2009. He explained that he had been made to believe that due to the dollarization Ecuador was part of the United States and that he would earn a minimum wage of \$1,500

¹³ Given their dominant numeric presence, it was surprising that it was almost impossible to conduct interviews with Chinese immigrants. According to Alejandro Díaz Chong, an Ecuadorian businessman of Chinese descent and secretary of the *Confederación y Asociación de la Colonia China en Ecuador*, Chinese immigrants do not want to be interviewed due to time constraints and language barriers.

monthly. In the context of human smuggling, the Honorary Consul described high levels of vulnerability among the Bangladeshi migrant population, with some arriving without the financial means to secure food and housing. Some Bangladeshi citizens are trapped in Ecuador and cannot return home because they lack money and travel documents, or fear facing the authorities at the border because of their irregular migratory status.

The author interviewed two groups of Pakistani men. In one instance, interviews were conducted with a group of nine men living together in very a humble three-bedroom-apartment. According to their accounts they are economic migrants, working as street vendors of silver jewellery or as restaurant workers, making about \$250 monthly, and being able to send about \$100 home to their families. Two of them admitted they had fallen victim to people smugglers, who had promised them that the flight to Ecuador would enable them to reach the United States. Both paid around \$10,000 for their journey to Ecuador, after selling all their belongings and lending money from family and friends. Although the interviewees knew of Pakistanis in other Latin American countries, they explained that visa requirements made the access to other Latin American countries very difficult.

The author conducted a second group interview with four Pakistani men who had been detained in the infamous operation ‘twilight’ (*operación crepúsculo*). In March 2011, the Ecuadorian police arrested 67 Asian and Arab immigrants, allegedly based on allegations of people smuggling and terrorism made by the US government.¹⁴ The interview was conducted just days before the men would voluntarily return to Pakistan. They all named economic motivations to migrate and explained that they had chosen Ecuador as a destination because of its open visa policy. Two of the four men had previously lived in the United States but had lost their visas due to minor criminal records. They affirmed instances of Pakistani people smuggling from Ecuador to the United States but strongly rejected any involvement of the detained men in terrorist activities.

5.2 African immigrants

Judging from the statistics, with a net migration of 632 from 2002 to 2010, the largest recent African immigrant group in Ecuador in mid-2011 were Eritreans. However, qualitative research revealed that very few Eritreans have remained in the country. In fact, immigrants from Eritrea, Ethiopia Somalia and Kenya seemed untraceable. Interviews with NGO workers and officials suggest that almost all of them had moved on towards their original destinations in the north with the help of people smuggling networks: the United States and Canada.¹⁵

Thus, Nigerians were the largest African immigrant population in Ecuador in mid-2011, with a net migration of 432 from 2002 to 2010, and an estimated population of 300 residing in Ecuador. The majority of recent Nigerian immigrants in Ecuador are male, ethnic Igbo and between 20-40 years old. Nigerians stand out because of their high educational levels and elevated economic means – often based on the financial assistance of family members and friends. Twelve of the eighteen Nigerian interviewees had a university degree and another five had finished high school.¹⁶ Interviewees shared with me that

¹⁴ The migrants were brought to a private house in Quito, which was guarded by police and military, and transgression judges (*jueces de contravenciones*) ordered the deportation of the entire group. Of the 67 detainees, 22 men from Sri Lanka and Pakistan were asylum seekers, and two were Ecuadorian citizens. They were illegally detained for three months and many of their rights were violated. In an interview with an official of the Public Protector, he stated that the detentions had been made on ethnic grounds, rounding up the Moslem immigrant population in Quito.

¹⁵ Official data on abandoned asylum application supports the hypothesis that the majority of Eritreans did not remain in the country. 85% of Eritrean asylum seekers had abandoned their application process by mid-2011.

¹⁶ These findings are in line with a quantitative study by Docquier and Marfouk (2006); in their analysis they found that, in 2000, 10.7% of the highly skilled population trained in Nigeria worked abroad. On average, 64% of the Nigerian emigrants had a tertiary education, and in the United States 83% were highly skilled.

they had given up ‘respectable’ jobs as accountants or bankers back home. Almost all Nigerian interviewees described the limited economic opportunities in Nigeria, in many cases despite their tertiary degrees, as the main motivation to leave Nigeria in search for better opportunities abroad. Some had travelled and worked in other countries such as South Africa, Libya, Oman and Spain, before making their way to Ecuador.

Visa-free access dominated their choice of coming to Ecuador. Most explained that they had found out about visa-free travel online and organised their journey independently via de Internet. Travel freedom to Ecuador presented an attractive opportunity in the light of the perception of increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Europe and North America. In fact, many of the interviewees didn’t know much about Ecuador – except for the fact that they could enter without a visa.

According to the Nigerian community leader in Quito, the vast majority of Africans come to Ecuador with the attention of an onward journey to Canada, the United States and the English-speaking Caribbean. In line with his assessment, almost all Nigerian migrants the author interviewed mentioned at least initial aspirations of using Ecuador as a gateway for onward migration to wealthier countries, predominantly Canada and the United States. Many explained that they had intentions of going back to Nigeria once they had ‘made it’ in Ecuador or North America. However, for some Nigerian migrants free access to Ecuador also presents the opportunity of settlement. Some interviewees explained that the United States and Canada had lost appeal to them as final destinations because of the on-going economic crisis. Others got stranded because they lacked the financial means to continue their onward journey. They then found life partners and/or business opportunities and decided to stay. While newly arrived Nigerian immigrants tend to work as English teachers, other who have stayed in Ecuador for longer own their own business, such as automobile garages.

5.3 Caribbean immigrants

Cubans are the largest recent Caribbean immigrant group in Ecuador, with a net migration rate of 8,467 from 2002 to 2010. Officials estimated the Cuban population at about 10,000 in mid-2011. In comparison to Asian and African immigrant groups, the presence of women in the Caribbean population is remarkable. Half of all interviewees from Cuba and Haiti were women. According to the interviewed immigrants and NGO workers this roughly mirrors the demographic make-up of both immigrant populations in Ecuador.

Similar to Nigerians, the most noteworthy characteristics of Cuban immigrants are their high educational levels. Most Cuban immigrants in Ecuador hold a tertiary degree. They are doctors, nurses, or technicians, in short, members of the Cuban ‘elite’ who could save the money needed to pay for the documents that allowed them to leave Cuba and arrive in Ecuador. Cubans pay between \$200 and \$5000 for the necessary paperwork such as an Ecuadorian invitation letter. With Cuban wages ranging between \$10 and \$30 Cuban interviewees explained that it would have been impossible to gather such amounts without the financial assistance of family members and friends abroad.

The main motivation of Cuban immigrants in Ecuador was to leave Cuba. Visa-free access to Ecuador and the friendly relationship between the Cuban and Ecuadorian government presented them a unique exit option out of Cuba. The majority of the Cubans the author interviewed came to Ecuador with entrepreneurial aspirations – or would like to work in their professions as doctors, nurses and teachers.¹⁷ Some Cubans have aspirations of eventually reaching the United States and Canada – in

¹⁷ A Cuban university teacher who could regularize her migratory situation through marrying an Ecuadorian friend and had lived in various countries before coming to Ecuador, expressed her consternation over the fact that most Cubans were attracted

many cases to be reunited with family members. A substantial number of interviewees – the vast majority with an irregular immigration status – explained that they sought a future in Ecuador and desired to productively contribute to the Ecuadorian economy and society if only they were given a chance through the regularisation of their immigration status. Many of the Cubans who could regularise their migratory status through a business visa or legal residency engage in the semi-official export of articles of daily use, e.g. cloths and soap, to Cuba.

In the case of Haitians, the net migration from 2002 to 2010 amounted to 1,294. Officials estimated the Haitian population in Ecuador at about 1000 in mid-2011. The qualitative fieldwork identified Haitian immigrants in Ecuador as the most vulnerable group of recent extra-continental immigrants. Most Haitians immigrants have medium to low educational levels. According to a study published by the Jesuit Migration and Refugee Service in 2009, 19% of Haitians in Quito had no formal education, and only 7% had finished a tertiary degree (JMRS 2009).

There are various accounts of people smugglers that lured Haitians to Ecuador on false promises of being able to study, work, or to travel to the US and French Guiana and from there to France and Europe.¹⁸ The author interviewed a young girl who had been part of a group of eight teenagers, who had been ‘accompanied’ to Ecuador by human smugglers after paying approximately \$4,000 each – believing that this would secure them bursaries for a university education in Ecuador. Free housing and a warm climate in Quito were promised, and the young Haitians arrive in very vulnerable conditions, lacking even the necessary clothing that would keep them warm. Some of them had studied at university level before the 2010 earthquake, which led to the destruction of many universities. The anecdotes of an interviewed Haitian community leader exemplify the high levels of misinformation and vulnerability, and the lack of education of many recently arrived Haitians, who commonly ask where to ‘find the bridge’ or ‘take the bus’ to France (or French Guyana).

In sum, in all cases the ease of access presented by Ecuador’s visa policy of open doors determined south-south migration from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean to Ecuador, whether this choice was made by migrants themselves or by people smugglers. The characteristics of recent extra-continental immigrants in Ecuador vary between and within national origins, from highly educated individuals who show high levels of agency to exploited victims of people smuggling. The qualitative analysis reveals the following main migrant motivations: (1) pressure to leave one’s country of origin, irrespective of the destination; (2) settlement in Ecuador because of relative improved opportunities; and (3) onward migration to North America and Europe.

6 Conclusions

This paper has identified three major gaps in the migration literature that make its application to intercontinental south-south migration inadequate: the dominant south-north bias; the neglect of the visa policies; and the neglect of migrant motivations in explaining international migration. Migration theory has largely developed based on studies of south-north movements to the United States and the European Union, although these flows only make up roughly a third of all international migration. The existing literature thus cultivates the inaccurate image of international migration as consisting of

by what she called the ‘Ecuadorian dream’ of accumulating a fortune in US Dollars but ended up only working to pay for their living expenses.

¹⁸ The Jesuit Migration and Refugee Service believes that the people smuggling networks that victimize Haitians operate in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and throughout South America: Ecuador, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela, Brazil and French Guiana.

constant global flows of people from less developed countries in the global south to developed nations in the north.

When explaining intercontinental south-south migration, essentially economic motivations of migrants can be considered a given. However, immigration policies, and especially the access policies of visa requirements, including short-stay visas, shape the global opportunity structures in which they move. This paper has shown that a liberalisation of the access policies of an economically relatively unattractive Latin American country led to a significant increase of south-south immigration from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. Although many interviewees expressed explicit motivations of transmigrating to North America, others primarily perceived Ecuador's visa freedom as an exit option out of their country of origin – and Ecuador not as their preferred destination, but as an accessible place of relatively improved opportunities.

These findings have important implications: they suggest breaking up preconceptions of international migration as fixed, dichotomous south-north movements, in favour of a global perspective of opportunity structures defined by access options, such as short-stay visa policies, as well as migrant motivations and capabilities. Increasingly restrictive northern visa policies, combined with the on-going economic problems, will likely deter growing numbers of immigrants to relatively attractive, accessible destinations in the global south. The visa policies of southern countries will significantly impact where these flows are diverted to, and thus which new south-south flows emerge.

Annex

Countries that did not require tourist visas to Ecuador prior to June 2008

Continent	Countries
Africa	South Africa
Asia	Japan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore
Central America & the Caribbean	Dominican Republic
Europe	Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Vatican
Middle East	Israel, Turkey
North America	Canada, United States
Oceania	Australia, New Zealand
South America	Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela

Source: Foreign Ministry of Ecuador

Countries that do not require tourist visas to Peru

Continent	Countries
Africa	South Africa
Asia	Brunei, Hong Kong, Philippines, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan
Central America & the Caribbean	Antigua Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Granada, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad y Tobago
Europe	Andorra, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Macedonia, Malta, Moldavia, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, Vatican
Middle East	Israel
North America	Canada, United States
Oceania	Australia, Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Salomon Islands, Nauru, Niue, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu
South America	Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela

Source: Foreign Ministry of Peru

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